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ABSTRACT 
Pro jec t ions  of d e f i c i t s  i n  excess  of $200 b i l l i o n  a year  through 1990 and 
beyond have r a i sed  cons iderable  concern about t h e  economic damage they  w i l l  
cause. Yet, many f i n d  i t  hard t o  desc r ibe  e x a c t l y  what harm d e f i c i t s  w i l l  
b r ing ,  o r  how such harm w i l l  come about.  This r epo r t  provides a b r i e f  qua l i -  
t a t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of what economic a n a l y s i s  sugges ts  t h a t  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  
w i l l  do t o  t h e  economy, and what t he  l i k e l y  consequences of t h e i r  r educ t ion  
w i l l  be. 
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WHAT LARGE DEFICITS WILL DO I F  THEY CONTINUE 
(AND WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF THEY ARE REDUCED) 
INTRODUCTION 
The Congress iona l  Budget O f f i c e  (CBO) e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  Budget 
d e f i c i t  w i l l  exceed $200 b i l l i o n  throughout  t h e  f i v e - y e a r  p e r i o d  o v e r  which 
CBO makes i t s  p r o j e c t i o n s .  l-/ T h i s  exceeds  5 p e r c e n t  of Gross  N a t i o n a l  P roduc t  
(GNP) i n  each  year .  It i s  a lmost  i n s t i n c t i v e  t o  f e e l  t h a t  t h e r e  is something 
wrong w i t h  runn ing  such  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s .  Y e t ,  i f  p r e s s e d  t o  s a y  j u s t  what harm 
w i l l  come from them, many f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  come up w i t h  an  adequa te  answer. 
Among t h e  reasons  g iven ,  one can h e a r  t h a t  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  d r i v e  up i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
and h a l t  t h e  economic recovery ,  c a u s i n g  a new r e c e s s i o n .  Another argument 
i s  t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  reduce c a p i t a l  fo rmat ion  and long-term growth. I n f l a -  
t i o n  i s  promised by some o b s e r v e r s  as t h e  consequence of budgetary  imbalance.  
Large t r a d e  d e f i c i t s  and j o b  l o s s  can a l s o  be t r a c e d  t o  d e f i c i t s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
some. 
Th is  r e p o r t  b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e s  what economic a n a l y s i s  s a y s  abou t  d e f i c i t s  
and what t h e y  do. I n  t h e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r ,  some of t h e  t h i n g s  d e f i c i t s  do n o t  
do -- i n  s p i t e  of what i s  s a i d  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y  -- a r e  d i s c u s s e d .  Chap te r  two 
e x p l a i n s  what t h e  a d v e r s e  consequences of d e f i c i t s  a r e .  The way i n  which p re -  
d i c t i o n s  of r e c e s s i o n  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  c h a p t e r  t h r e e .  
1/ Congress iona l  Budget O f f i c e .  Economic and Budget Outlook f o r  F i s c a l  
years-1986-1990. February 1985. 
F i n a l l y ,  chapter  fou r  desc r ibes  t he  l i k e l y  economic outcome of a  major d e f i c i t  
reduct ion.  
I. WHAT DEFICITS ARE NOT LIKELY TO DO ( I N  CONTRAST TO WHAT I S  FREQUENTLY 
REPORTED) 
Three  a s s e r t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  made concern ing  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  l e v e l  
of d e f i c i t  spend ing  are t h a t  i t  t h r e a t e n s  t o  a r r e s t  t h e  c u r r e n t  economic expan- 
s i o n  o r  p r e c i p i t a t e  a  new downturn, t h a t  i t  w i l l  be i n f l a t i o n a r y ,  and t h a t  i t  
c r e a t e s  j o b l e s s n e s s  through i t s  e f f e c t  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  None of t h e s e  
p r o p o s i t i o n s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  what mainstream economic a n a l y s i s  s a y s  abou t  
how d e f i c i t s  and t h e  economy work. - 21 
A,  Recess ion and Trade E f f e c t s  
The a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t s  t h r e a t e n  con t inued  economic expans ion  s tems 
from t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The argument i s  t h a t  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  
t h e  l e v e l  of Government borrowing ( a  consequence of b i g g e r  d e f i c i t s )  d r i v e s  up 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  which i n  t u r n  reduce b u s i n e s s  inves tment  i n  p l a n t ,  equipment,  
and i n v e n t o r y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  household purchases  of consumer d u r a b l e s  and housing.  
A s  a  consequence of t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  demand f o r  t h e s e  i t e m s ,  employment and 
income f a l l  i n  t h e s e  c r i t i c a l  s e c t o r s  of t h e  economy. 
21  While i t  may be imposs ib le  t o  s t a t e  p r e c i s e l y  what i s  and i s  n o t  "main- - 
s t ream" economic t h i n k i n g ,  i t  might b e s t  be d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t a u g h t  i n  
most g r a d u a t e  and undergradua te  economics courses  o r  a s  expressed  i n  t h e  coun- 
t r y ' s  b e s t - s e l l i n g  textbooks.  Consu l t ,  f o r  example, t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  two b e s t -  
s e l l i n g  i n t e r m e d i a t e  macroeconomic t ex tbooks :  Gordon, R . J .  Macroeconomics. 
L i t t l e  Brown, Boston,  1984; and Dornbush, R. and F i s c h e r ,  S .  Macroeconomics. 
McGraw H i l l .  1983. 
A s i m i l a r  s t o r y  is  t o l d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  A s  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  r i s e ,  U.S. a s s e t s  become more a t t r a c t i v e  r e l a t i v e  t o  lower-yie lding a s s e t s  
abroad.  As a r e s u l t ,  f o r e i g n e r s  want t o  buy more U.S. a s s e t s  and Americans wish 
t o  buy fewer f o r e i g n  ones. S i n c e  purchases  of 1J.S. assets must be made i n  dol-  
lars, f o r e i g n e r s  a t tempt  t o  o b t a i n  more d o l l a r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  make t h e s e  a c q u i s i -  
t i o n s .  A t  t h e  same t ime,  fewer d o l l a r s  a r e  made a v a i l a b l e  by U.S. c i t i z e n s  
t r y i n g  t o  buy f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .  The combined e f f e c t  of t h i s  i n c r e a s e d  d o l l a r  
demand and decreased  d o l l a r  supp ly  is  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  d o l l a r  
i n  markets  where i t  i s  exchanged f o r  o t h e r  c u r r e n c i e s .  The h i g h e r  v a l u e  of t h e  
d o l l a r  makes impor t s  cheaper  ( i t  t a k e s  fewer d o l l a r s  t o  buy t h e  f o r e i g n  cur rency  
needed t o  buy impor t s )  and e x p o r t s  more expensive  (because  more f o r e i g n  cur rency  
i s  needed t o  buy t h e  d o l l a r s  necessa ry  t o  purchase  t h e  e x p o r t s ) .  U.S. e x p o r t s  
d e c l i n e ,  and domest ic  demand f o r  goods t h a t  compete w i t h  imports  f a l l s .  The 
r e s u l t  is  a rise i n  unemployment. 
The problem w i t h  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  is  t h a t  it i s  on ly  p a r t  of t h e  t o t a l  e f f e c t  
of d e f i c i t s .  While reducing employment and income i n  some s e c t o r s  of t h e  eco- 
nomy, l a r g e r  d e f i c i t s  a l s o  i n c r e a s e  employment and income i n  o t h e r  s e c t o r s .  In- 
deed,  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  can be expec ted  t o  exceed t h e  d e c r e a s e s  f o r  a n e t  g a i n  i n  
economic a c t i v i t y  a s  a consequence of b i g g e r  d e f i c i t s .  
An i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  of borrowing (which i s  what d r i v e s  up i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s ) ,  i m p l i e s  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  -- e i t h e r  a s  a consequence of more 
Government spending o r  reduced t a x e s .  I f  it i s  due t o  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  Government 
spending,  demand w i l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h o s e  i n d u s t r i e s  producing goods ( o r  i n  t h o s e  
producing s e r v i c e s )  purchased by t h e  Government. 21 I f  t h e  d e f i c i t  i n c r e a s e  
31  O r  t h o s e  purchased by i n d i v i d u a l s  r e c e i v i n g  t r a n s f e r  payments from 
t h e  Ggvernment . 
is due t o  a  c u t  i n  t a x e s ,  t h e  d i s p o s a b l e  income ( t h a t  income which i s  l e f t  f o r  
spending a f t e r  t a x e s )  r i s e s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  prompting a  g r e a t e r  demand f o r  
consumption goods. 21 The l o s s  of demand from t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  d e f i c i t  on 
investment  and n e t  e x p o r t s  cannot  exceed t h e  g a i n s  from Government purchases  
and consumption. 
T h i s  can be e a s i l y  i l l u s t r a t e d .  The e x t r a  borrowing by t h e  Government 
must e q u a l  t h e  e x t r a  demand i t  d i r e c t l y  c r e a t e s  by i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  d e f i c i t .  I f  
borrowing i n c r e a s e s  by $100, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  d i r e c t  demand s t i m u l u s  e q u a l s  $100. 
For  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  h u r t  economic r e c o v e r y ,  t h e n ,  
p r i v a t e  investment  ( o r  n e t  e x p o r t s )  must f a l l  by more t h a n  $100. Ye t ,  i f  
Government borrowing r i s e s  by l e s s  than  p r i v a t e  borrowing f a l l s ,  t o t  a 1  demand 
f o r  borrowing goes down -- and a  f a l l  i n  demand f o r  borrowed funds  i m p l i e s  a  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Hence t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  Government 
borrowing h u r t s  recovery i s  based on a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  It  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  a rgues  
t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  go up w h i l e  implying t h a t  t h e y  f a l l .  
Indeed ,  t h e  above e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  t h e  wors t -case  s c e n a r i o  -- where t h e  e x t r a  
demand boost  from Government borrowing i s  e x a c t l y  o f f s e t  by t h e  demand r e d u c t i o n  
r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e f f e c t .  Most l i k e l y  t h e  o f f s e t  w i l l  be incom- 
p l e t e ,  s o  t h a t  a  n e t  s t i m u l u s  t o  employment occurs .  The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i n c r e a s e  
a f f e c t s  t h e  g e n e r a l  d e s i r e  of t h e  p u b l i c  t o  ho ld  i n t e r e s t - e a r n i n g  a s s e t s  l i k e  
s e c u r i t i e s  as opposed t o  money (which e a r n s  l i t t l e  o r  no i n t e r e s t ) .  I n  a n  
e f f o r t  t o  s w i t c h  frommoney t o  e a r n i n g  a s s e t s ,  t h e  p u b l i c  pushes s e c u r i t y  p r i c e s  
41 O f  course ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  might choose t o  s a v e  t h e  e x t r a  d i s p o s a b l e  - 
income. I f  they  d i d ,  however, t h e y  would be i n t r o d u c i n g  an  a d d i t i o n a l  supp ly  
of s a v i n g  on c r e d i t  markets  t h a t  would s a t i s f y  t h e  ex t raademand  from Government 
borrowing. The two e f f e c t s  would o f f s e t  each o t h e r ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would n o t  
r i s e ,  and no  employment o r  unemployment e f f e c t s  would occur .  
up, which moderates t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i n c r e a s e .  5 1  Consequently,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  - 
do not  r i s e  enough t o  reduce demand i n  i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  s e c t o r s  a s  much a s  
demand i n c r e a s e s  i n  o t h e r  s e c t o r s .  A s  long a s  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  unemployed and 
t h e  economy i s  o p e r a t i n g  below c a p a c i t y ,  t h e  economy can produce more i n  response  
t o  t h e  s t i m u l u s ;  more g e t s  saved a s  a  consequence of t h e  i n c r e a s e d  income; and 
t h e  need f o r  s a v i n g  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  e x t r a  borrowing i s  s a t i s f i e d .  
T h i s  e x p l a i n s  why, f o r  s o  many y e a r s ,  d e f i c i t s  were regarded a s  p a r t  of 
eco~iomic s t imulus .  It is  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  growing i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  of 
t h e  economy h a s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  respons iveness  of c a p i t a l  f lows ,  and t h a t  t h i s  
h a s  weakened t h e  s t i m u l a t i v e  demand e f f e c t s  of l a r g e r  d e f i c i t s  by i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e  employment o f f s e t  coming from poore r  e x p o r t  performance. However, t h e r e  
is  s t i l l  good reason  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  of l a r g e r  d e f i c i t s  is  
s t i m u l a t i v e ,  and t h a t  employment i s  improved -- n o t  h u r t  -- by growing d e f i c i t s .  
B. I n f l a t i o n  
The n o t i o n  t h a t  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  worsen i n f l a t i o n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  a n a l y z e  because t h e  means by which Government borrowing i s  supposed t o  
a f f e c t  p r i c e s  i s  r a r e l y  s p e c i f i e d  by those  making t h e  claim. The argument 
probably  has  i t s  r o o t s  i n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  exp la ined  i n  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  -- t h a t  
i n c r e a s i n g  d e f i c i t s  s t i m u l a t e  demand. A demand s t i m u l u s  -- e s p e c i a l l y  when 
supply i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  meet i t  -- can g e n e r a t e  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r i c e s .  
However, i n f l a t i o n  i s  t h e  change i n  p r i c e s ,  no t  t h e i r  l e v e l ,  s o  t h a t  i t  
i s  the  change i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  and not i t s  l e v e l  t h a t  i s  t h e  r e a l  f i s c a l  
5 1  The p r i c e  of an  a s s e t  e a r n i n g  a  f i x e d  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  r i s e s  as pre- 
v a i l i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f a l l  and vice-versa .  
determinant of t he  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n .  - 6 1  Current  and p ro j ec t ed  d e f i c i t s  a r e  
very l a rge ;  but  t h a t  is i r r e l e v a n t  because d e f i c i t s  must be i n c r e a s i n g  t o  in- 
c r ea se  p r i c e s .  Current p r o j e c t i o n s  of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t  ( t h e  p a r t  no t  
caused by changes i n  economic a c t i v i t y )  L1 show only  r e l a t i v e l y  minor i nc reases .  
Thus, any i n f l a t i o n  from t h e  e f f e c t s  of d e f i c i t  changes on demand i s  l i k e l y  t o  
be small .  
It may be argued t h a t  d e f i c i t s  a r e  monetized by t h e  Federa l  Reserve System 
( t h a t  i s ,  f inanced  by c r e a t i n g  money), o r  t h a t  t h e  debt  t h a t  is  i s sued  t o  f i nance  
d e f i c i t s  is a  c l o s e  enough s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  money t h a t  i t s  accumulation i s  poten- 
t i a l l y  i n f l a t i o n a r y .  Evidence sugges ts ,  however, t h a t  n e i t h e r  of t h e s e  phen- 
omena occurs  t o  any ex tens ive  degree.  8/ Consequently, i n f l a t i o n  does not  appear  
t o  be a  very  l i k e l y  outcome of even $200 b i l l i o n  d e f i c i t s  over  t h e  next f i v e  
years .  
C. Summary 
It i s  s a i d  t h a t  d e f i c i t s  t h r e a t e n  t o  h a l t  t h e  cu r r en t  expansion through 
t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  t h a t  they cause job l o s s  due t o  t h e i r  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  e f f e c t s ,  and t h a t  they a r e  p o t e n t i a l l y  i n f l a t i o n a r y .  None of 
61 See U.S. L ibrary  of Congress. Congressional  Research Serv ice .  Defi- 
c i t s  &d Macroeconomic S t a b i l i z a t i o n :  Is i t  How Big they Are o r  How Much they  
Change t h a t  Mat te rs?  CRS Report No. 85-47 E, by G. Thomas Woodward. Washing- 
ton ,  1985. 
71 For an explana t ion  of s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i t s ,  s ee  U.S. Lib ra ry  of 
congress .  Congressional Research Service.  S t r u c t u r a l  D e f i c i t s  : D e f i n i t i o n  
and Measurement. CRS Brief MB84217, by Thomas Woodward. Washington. Con- 
t i nuous ly  updated. 
81 O r  t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  monet izat ion occurs ,  i t  is  not a  necessary  
conse&ence of d e f i c i t s .  See D e f i c i t s  and Economic S t a b i l i z a t i o n .  
these  claims a r e  supported by mainstream economic theory o r  evidence. The 
f i r s t  two claims neglec t  t h e  of f  s e t t i n g  employment and demand e f f e c t s  of d e f i c i t s  
which can r e s u l t  i n  a ne t  s t imulus  t o  employment -- r a t h e r  than a con t r ac t i on .  
The l a s t  neg l ec t s  t he  c r u c i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between changes i n  d e f i c i t s  which 
can push up demand (and, pos s ib ly ,  p r i c e s )  and l e v e l s  of d e f i c i t s  -- which do 
not.  
11. WHAT DEFICITS PROBABLY WILL DO ( I F  THEY CONTINUE TO BE LARGE) 
I f  t h e  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  t h a t  a r e  p ro j ec t ed  through t h e  beginning of t h e  
next decade a r e  n e i t h e r  l i k e l y  t o  slow t h e  cu r r en t  expansion nor  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
r a i s e  i n f l a t i o n ,  i t  is  n a t u r a l  t o  wonder j u s t  what harm they w i l l  do. Indeed, 
it might seem undes i r ab l e  t o  reduce o r  e l i m i n a t e  them i f  t h a t  i s  t h e  case.  
The answer t o  t h i s  is t h a t  s t i m u l a t i n g  and reducing demand i n  t h e  economy i s  
not  t he  only economic process one needs t o  be concerned with.  
The Al loca t ion  of Output and Future  Consumption 
A s  expla ined  above, changes i n  t h e  Government's budget d e f i c i t  a f f e c t  t h e  
l e v e l  of investment ,  n e t  expor t s ,  and f o r e i g n  ownership of U.S. a s s e t s .  This  
means t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t  a f f e c t s  t h e  k inds  of goods produced i n  t h e  economy and 
u l t i m a t e l y  how much t h e  country w i l l  be a b l e  t o  consume i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  l a r g e r  budget d e f i c i t s  tend t o  reduce investment ,  t h e  
c a p i t a l  s t ock  grows more slowly than i t  would have otherwise.  A smaller c a p i t a l  
s t ock  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  w i l l  g ene ra l l y  mean l e s s  output  than could o therwise  be 
produced by t h e  same l abo r  force .  This  reduces p o t e n t i a l  f u t u r e  consumption. 
To the  e x t e n t  t h a t  investment is  l a r g e l y  una f f ec t ed ,  but t h a t  n e t  expor t s  
f a l l ,  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t ock  w i l l  grow a s  f a s t  a s  o therwise ,  but a  l a r g e r  p ropor t i on  
of i t  w i l l  belong t o  fo re igne r s .  Consequently, whi le  f u t u r e  output  may be 
unaf fec ted  by t h e  Government's f i s c a l  po l i cy ,  a  sma l l e r  amount of t h a t  ou tput  
w i l l  go t o  Americans. F u t u r e  p o t e n t i a l  consumption, aga in ,  w i l l  be s m a l l e r  
t h a n  i t  would be wi thou t  t h e  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s .  
Thus, t h e  r e a l  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t  of l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  is long-run i n  n a t u r e .  
I n s t e a d  of h u r t i n g  t h e  shor t - run  demand f o r  goods and s e r v i c e s ,  they  h u r t  long- 
run  supply.  D e f i c i t s  may n o t  reduce income l e v e l s  now, but  they shou ld  reduce 
f u t u r e  income and /or  consumption. They permit  an i n c r e a s e  i n  c u r r e n t  consump- 
t i o n  on ly  a t  t h e  expense of consumption i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
B. D e f i c i t s ,  Debt, and I n t e r e s t  Out lays  
While t h e  e f f e c t s  of d e f i c i t s  occur  l a r g e l y  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  and w h i l e  t h e  
expected e f f e c t s  may a t  t h i s  p o i n t  may be r e l a t i v e l y  small, t h e r e  is a n o t h e r  
f e a t u r e  of t h e  budget t h a t  makes d e f i c i t s  p o t e n t i a l l y  more damaging. Th is  is  
t h e  feedback e f f e c t  d e f i c i t s  have on d e b t ,  Government i n t e r e s t  o u t l a y s ,  and 
f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s .  
A l a r g e  d e f i c i t  produces s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  deb t  ( t h e  cumulat ive  
amount t h e  Government owes). S i n c e  t h e  Government must pay i n t e r e s t  on i t s  
borrowings,  a d d i t i o n s  t o  t h e  deb t  add t o  Government i n t e r e s t  o u t l a y s .  Th i s  
means t h a t  even wi thout  l e g i s l a t e d  changes i n  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  o r  I n c r e a s e s  i n  
o u t l a y s  due t o  adverse  economic c o n d i t i o n s ,  Government o u t l a y s  s t i l l  i n c r e a s e  
a s  a  consequence of r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  o b l i g a t i o n s .  I f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  b i l l  r i s e s  
f a s t e r  t h a n  economic growth can push up revenues ,  t h e  d e f i c i t  -- because  i t  i s  
a l r e a d y  l a r g e  -- must a l s o  grow. Tax i n c r e a s e s  and /or  expendi tu re  c u t s  a r e  
r e q u i r e d  j u s t  t o  keep t h e  d e f i c i t  from g e t t i n g  b i g g e r .  
Hence, a  l a r g e  d e f i c i t  which may not  have very  g r e a t  e f f e c t s  on f u t u r e  
consumption (and may not have them soon) h a s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  become a  ve ry  
l a r g e  d e f i c i t  t h a t  does have such e f f e c t s  i f  i t  i s  l e f t  unat tended.  D e f i c i t  
reduc t ion  can be requi red  j u s t  t o  keep t h e  d e f i c i t  from growing. Immediate 
d e f i c i t  r educ t ion  can be d e s i r a b l e  because t h e  growth of i n t e r e s t  o b l i g a t i o n s  
over  t ime inc reases  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  t a x  i n c r e a s e s  o r  expendi ture  r educ t ions  
t h a t  w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  be needed t o  balance t h e  budget. 
C. Summary 
D e f i c i t s  may be regarded a s  harmful t o  t h e  economy because of  t h e i r  poten- 
t i a l  t o  reduce f u t u r e  consumption. This r e s u l t  can occur  because t h e  i n t e r e s t  
rate e f f e c t s  of Government borrowing e i t h e r  reduce investment o r  encourage 
c a p i t a l  inf lows.  Consequently, e i t h e r  less i s  produced i n  t h e  f u t u r e  than  
would be o therwise  o r  a sma l l e r  amount of what i s  produced winds up as income 
f o r  Americans. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  ve ry  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  can cause a growth i n  
Government indebtedness  and i n t e r e s t  o b l i g a t i o n s  s o  r a p i d  t h a t  o u t l a y s  o r  t a x e s  
must be ad jus t ed  j u s t  t o  keep t h e  d e f i c i t  from growing. Thus, i t  may a l s o  be 
d e s i r a b l e  t o  reduce c u r r e n t  d e f i c i t s  j u s t  t o  prevent  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  from g e t t i n g  
ou t  of hand. 

111. HOW A RECESSION MAY ENTER THE PICTURE ( IF  IT IS NOT TO BE CAUSED 
BY DEFICITS) 
The f a c t  t h a t  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  not cause a  c o n t r a c t i o n  does not  mean 
t h e r e  w i l l  no t  be one. Indeed, a  number of economists,  aware t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t s  
do not  t h r e a t e n  a  downturn, none the less  expect a  c o n t r a c t i o n  i n  economic a c t i -  
v i t y  next year .  These expec t a t i ons  a r e  l a r g e l y  due t o  assumptions about monetary 
po l icy .  There is  widespread b e l i e f  t h a t  monetary po l i cy  is  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  
l a s t  f o u r  r eces s ions ,  and t h a t  i t  may cause t h e  next.  
Transac t ions  i n  a  developed economy must be conducted through t h e  medium 
of money. The use  of b a r t e r  i n  exchange s i g n i f i c a n t l y  cons t r a in s  commerce. 
Hence, an economy's a b i l i t y  t o  gene ra t e  income depends t o  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  degree 
on t h e r e  being s u f f i c i e n t  q u a n t i t i e s  of money. Given t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  determine 
how much money people wish t o  hold and given t h e  p r i c e s  t h a t  have been set f o r  
t h e  goods and s e r v i c e s  t o  be exchanged, t h e  q u a n t i t y  of money w i l l  determine 
t h e  l e v e l  of income. I n  t h e  longer  run,  when p r i c e s  can a d j u s t  a s  necessary  
t o  keep income a t  l e v e l s  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e  economy's capac i ty  ou tpu t ,  t h e  
q u a n t i t y  of money becomes an important determinant of t h e  l e v e l  of p r i c e s .  
A s  a  r e s u l t  of t h i s ,  c o n t r o l  of t h e  supply of money is e s s e n t i a l  i n  con- 
t r o l l i n g  t h e  long-run inc rease  i n  p r i c e s  ( t h a t  is ,  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  r a t e  of 
i n f l a t i o n ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  e f f o r t s  t o  reduce i n f l a t i o n  by reducing monetary 
growth w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  r e s u l t  i n  short-run reduc t ions  i n  income ( t h a t  is ,  
economic con t r ac t i on ) .  
E f f o r t s  t o  reduce i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o f t e n  imply r eces s ion .  This 
problem is  f u r t h e r  complicated by the  f a c t  t h a t  money growth is not  e a s i l y  
measured, t h a t  t h e  " r i g h t "  q u a n t i t y  of money f o r  a  given l e v e l  of income can 
not be determined with much accuracy, and t h a t  c o n t r o l  over t h e  money supply 
is  incomplete* Even without d e l i b e r a t e l y  pursuing a  po l i cy  t o  slow monetary 
and economic growth, monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  can e a s i l y  do so  un in t en t iona l ly .  
The a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  monetary po l i cy  begun i n  l a t e  1979 met with consid- 
e r a b l e  success  during t h e  1981-82 recess ion .  The ga ins  made dur ing  t h a t  per iod 
appear t o  have been maintained. Yet, while t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  has  been halved 
( o r  b e t t e r ) ,  a  r a t e  of f o u r  t o  f i v e  percent p r i c e  i nc rease  is  expected t o  per- 
sist  f o r  some t i m e  t o  come. This  l e v e l  of i n f l a t i o n  was considered i n t o l e r a b l y  
high i n  1971 (enough t o  br ing  about wage-price c o n t r o l s ) .  Consequently, i t  i s  
not  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  a  new concerted push t o  reduce i n f l a t i o n  f u r t h e r  through slower 
monetary growth could be forthcoming some time i n  t h e  next few years .  
I f  such events  t r a n s p i r e ,  i t  is important t o  r e c a l l  t h a t  i t  is  not  t h e  
cont inu ing  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  t h a t  p r e c i p i t a t e  them. The con t r ac t i on ,  however, 
while  not caused by t h e  d e f i c i t s ,  w i l l  have an e f f e c t  on them. The reduc t ion  
i n  t a x  revenues and swel l ing  of Government expendi tures  t h a t  r e s u l t  from reduc- 
t i o n s  i n  economic a c t i v i t y  would bal loon t h e  s i z e  of t h e  d e f i c i t  t o  perhaps 
$300 o r  $400 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  This would s i g n i f i c a n t l y  aggravate  t h e  feedback 
e f f e c t  on deb t  and i n t e r e s t  payments -- so much s o  t h a t  without e f f o r t s  t o  br ing  
the  budget under c o n t r o l ,  t h e  d e f i c i t  would cont inue  t o  i nc rease  r a p i d l y  a s  a  
r e s u l t .  
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IV. LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF DEFICIT REDUCTION 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, large deficits, continuing for 
the foreseeable future, are likely to have, if anything, salutary short-run 
effects on employment and income and adverse long-run effects on potential 
future consumption. It stands to reason that the opposite is true of the 
effects of significant deficit reduction. Future consumption possibilities 
should be enhanced by reducing the deficit, while the immediate cyclical impact 
may be deleterious. 
Because increases in the deficit tend to stimulate aggregate demand and 
employment, a substantial reduction in the deficit should slow the economic 
expansion. This much is largely unambiguous. The real question is how much. 
Given the size of the potential deficit reduction, the possibility of inducing 
a new recession as a consequence of bringing the budget closer to balance is 
real. 
On one hand, as explained earlier, many indications exist that changes in 
the size of the deficit exert only weak pressure on demand. Much of the stimulus 
from cutting taxes and increasing expenditures appears to be offset by the 
foreign capital flows and net export reductions brought about by the interest 
rate effects of Government borrowing. z/ Hence, one could expect that the 
9/ For a more detailed discussion of the implications of international 
tradeand exchange rate regimes on stabilization policy, see U.S. Library of 
Congress. Congressional Research Service. U.S. Economic Policy in an Inter- 
national Context; Deficits, Taxes, and Monetary Policy; by Jane G. Gravelle 
and G. Thomas Woodward. CRS Report no. 84-125 E. Wasington, 1984. 
d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t  of a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  budget d e f i c i t  would a l s o  be weak, 
o f f s e t  i n  p a r t  by t h e  s t i m u l u s  from an  i n c r e a s e  i n  n e t  expor t s .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, two f a c t o r s  -- t h e  t iming  of t h e  s t i m u l u s  and con t rac -  
t i o n ,  and t h e  p r i c e  e f f e c t s  of d o l l a r  d e v a l u a t i o n  -- may n o n e t h e l e s s  work t o  
cause  a  temporary c o n t r a c t i o n  i n  economic a c t i v i t y .  
Because f i n a n c i a l  f lows  can s h i f t  q u i c k l y ,  a  budget r e d u c t i o n  l a r g e  enough 
t o  a f f e c t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  can produce a f a i r l y  immediate e f f e c t  on t h e  v a l u e  
of t h e  d o l l a r .  However, e x p o r t s  and imports  r e a c t  t o  exchange r a t e  changes w i t h  
some l a g .  Indeed,  g iven  f a c t o r s  l i k e  t h e  t ime goods spend i n  t r a n s i t ,  many 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commercial commitments a r e  made i n  advance of t h e  exchange of 
cur rency ,  s o  t h a t  changes i n  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  d o l l a r  w i l l  have next t o  no e f f e c t  
on n e t  e x p o r t s  a t  f i r s t .  
T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t  of t h e  d e f i c i t  r e d u c t i o n  on demand 
comes f i r s t .  The p a r t i a l l y  o f f s e t t i n g  s t i m u l u s  t o  ne t  e x p o r t s  comes l a t e r ,  s o  
t h a t  t h e  immediate r e s u l t  of d e f i c i t  r educ t ion  w i l l  probably  be more contrac-  
t i o n a r y  t h a n  i t s  u l t i m a t e  n e t  e f f e c t .  The shor t - run  impact could  be enough t o  
p r e c i p i t a t e  a  downturn. 
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  because a  f a l l  i n  t h e  d o l l a r  r a i s e s  t h e  p r i c e  of impor t s ,  a  
component of t h e  g e n e r a l  l e v e l  of p r i c e s  r i s e s .  I n  t h e  shor t - run,  t h i s  can be 
a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  pronounced phenomenon, s i n c e  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  t o  escape  many i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  commercial commitments means t h a t  American i m p o r t e r s  have l i t t l e  cho ice  
but  t o  demand f o r e i g n  cur rency  i n  t h e  f a c e  of reduced w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s e l l  i t  -- 
d r i v i n g  t h e  d o l l a r  down i n  v a l u e  t emporar i ly  below t h e  l e v e l  i t  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  
assume. T h i s  exacerba tes  t h e  p r i c e  e f f e c t  d e s c r i b e d  above. The p r i c e  i n c r e a s e  
i s  f u r t h e r  sp read  a s  import-competing i n d u s t r i e s  f a c e  reduced c o m p e t i t i v e  pres-  
s u r e s  and r a i s e  t h e i r  p r i c e s ,  and a s  a l l  t h e s e  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  p a s s  through t h e  
economy. 
Yet,  t h e  p r i c e  i nc reases  cannot be s u s t a i n e d  without  a d d i t i o n a l  money 
c r ea t ion .  Unless t h e  Federa l  Reserve becomes more accomodative, t h e  end r e s u l t  
i s  a  c o n t r a c t i o n  i n  economic a c t i v i t y  t h a t  w i l l  p e r s i s t  u n t i l  t h e  g e n e r a l  l e v e l  
of p r i c e s  is  ad jus t ed  downward. The Federal  Reserve could, of course,  r a i s e  t h e  
r a t e  of expansion of t h e  money supply, but t h i s  would make t h e  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e  
permanent and poss ib ly  r a i s e  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  t h e r e a f t e r .  
B r i e f l y  then,  a  major reduc t ion  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  w i l l  have v i r t u a l l y  t h e  
oppos i t e  e f f e c t  of t h a t  expected by many casua l  observers .  Rather  than  "super- 
charge" t h e  cu r r en t  expansion, i t  w i l l  probably slow i t  down and may even cause 
a  con t r ac t i on  accompanied by a  temporary surge  i n  p r i ce s .  The b e n e f i t s  of 
d e f i c i t  r educ t ion  a r e  long term -- not s h o r t  term -- i n  nature .  

CONCLUSION 
The r e a l  damage t h a t  cont inu ing  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  do t o  t h e  economy i s  not  
i n  reducing employment o r  t h r ea t en ing  t h e  completion of t h e  recovery, Indeed, 
t h e  aggrega te  shor t - run  e f f e c t s  of d e f i c i t  growth a r e  t o  he lp  i n c r e a s e  employ- 
ment and income. 
Current p ro j ec t i ons  of d e f i c i t s  do not c a r r y  much t h r e a t  of worsening 
i n f l a t i o n ,  e i t h e r .  It  i s  how much d e f i c i t s  grow r a t h e r  than  how b i g  they a r e  
t h a t  pu ts  upward p re s su re  on p r i ce s .  The cu r r en t  and p ro j ec t ed  d e f i c i t s ,  whi le  
l a r g e ,  a r e  no t  growing enough t o  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e  i n f l a t i o n .  
The adverse consequences of d e f i c i t s  come from t h e i r  long-run e f f e c t s  on 
f u t u r e  p o t e n t i a l  consumption. To the  ex t en t  t h a t  they s h i f t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of 
output  away from investment ,  a  bmaller  f u t u r e  c a p i t a l  s t ock  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
produce output  l a t e r  on* Less income r e s u l t s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  d e f i c i t s  
s h i f t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of output  from ne t  expor t s ,  they  induce c a p i t a l  i n f lows  
t h a t  cause a  l a r g e r  propor t ion  of t h e  c a p i t a l  s t ock  t o  be owned by f o r e i g n e r s .  
Less of t h e  ou tput  produced i n  t h e  f u t u r e  is  l e f t  over  f o r  Americans t o  consume. 
Even though these  e f f e c t s  a r e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  and even though they may be 
r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  compared t o  t o t a l  consumption (given t h e  s i z e  of t h e  d e f i c i t s ) ,  
l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  have an  a d d i t i o n a l  e f f e c t  t h a t  may nonethe less  make i t  d e s i r a b l e  
t o  reduce them now. Large d e f i c i t s  cause s u b s t a n t i a l  a d d i t i o n s  t o  t h e  Govern- 
ment's debt .  This  i nc reases  i ts  i n t e r e s t  burden -- poss ib ly  f a s t e r  than t h e  
growth of t h e  economy can i n c r e a s e  t a x  revenues. A s  a consequence, d e f i c i t s  
grow l a r g e r  and have g r e a t e r  economic e f f e c t s  over  time. 
Moreover, t h e  longer  i t  takes  t o  reduce t he  d e f i c i t ,  t h e  bigger  expendi ture  
c u t s  o r  t a x  i n c r e a s e s  have t o  be t o  do t h e  job. 
A con t r ac t i on  can, neve r the l e s s ,  be i n  t h e  p i c t u r e  some time soon. Monetary 
po l icy  aimed a t  reducing i n f l a t i o n  f u r t h e r  could p r e c i p i t a t e  a  slowdown i n  eco- 
nomic a c t i v i t y .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  a  reduc t ion  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  could do t h e  same i n  t h e  
s h o r t  run, e s p e c i a l l y  i f  the  response of expor t s  and imports t o  a f a l l  i n  t h e  
d o l l a r  exchange r a t e  i s  slow. A temporary surge  i n  p r i c e s  would a l s o  be a con- 
sequence of d e f i c i t  reduct ion.  C lea r ly ,  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  reducing t h e  d e f i c i t  
i s  long-run and not  short-run i n  charac te r .  
